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Recently, great interest has been aroused in the examination of the impact of offshore 
sourcing, which has increased rapidly across the world and expanded to cover  a variety of 
tasks. Theoretical studies have shown that offshore sourcing contributes to higher 
productivity. This paper aims to provide evidence of the effect of offshore sourcing on 
productivity, on the basis of original survey data of offshore sourcing of Japanese firms. The 
estimation results show that offshore in-sourcing within multinationals has a positive impact 
on productivity but there is a time-lag in the appearance of the impact. On the other hand, it 
is found that offshore outsourcing through arm’s-length contracting out did not appear to 
affect productivity despite the expectation that the reallocation of resources to more 
advanced production processes contributes to productivity. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, great interest has been aroused in the examination of the impact of offshore sourcing to 
foreign countries that has increased rapidly and expanded over various tasks. It is remarkable that the 
offshore sourcing of not only production parts, intermediate goods, and final assemblies but also 
financial, legal, and customer support services increased. There is evidence of recent development of 
theoretical studies on offshore sourcing. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Baldwin and 
Robert-Nicoud (2007) showed that offshore sourcing contributes to higher production efficiency. 
Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004) indicated that on the basis of productivity and sectoral 
characteristics, firms decide whether to produce intermediate inputs or outsource them. A number of 
empirical studies have focused on the effect of offshore sourcing on the labor market in source 
countries (e.g., Ekholm and Hakkala, 2006; Egger and Egger, 2006; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999; 
Geishecker and Görg, 2005; Head and Ries, 2002; Helg and Tajoli, 2005; Hijzen et al., 2005) while 
few studies at the firm-level have examined the economic impact of offshore sourcing. This paper aims 
to provide empirical evidence of the causal effect of offshore sourcing on growth of firm productivity 
using unique micro-data on Japanese manufacturing firms. 
Previous empirical studies that have explored this issue using industry-level data suggest that 
offshore sourcing positively affects productivity (e.g., Amiti and Wei, 2006; Egger and Egger, 2006; 
Ito and Tanaka, 2009). As the first attempt using firm-level data, Görg and Hanley (2005) examined 
the effect of offshore outsourcing on labor productivity using Irish firm-level data in the electronics 
industry over the period 1990–1995. They found that the impact of offshore outsourcing on total factor 
productivity (TFP) to be positive, when estimating the effect of outsourcing of materials and services 
combined; however, they discovered the effect of outsourcing of services to no longer have a   2
significant impact when distinguishing between two tasks.
1 Their advantage is no doubt that the data 
on offshore outsourcing can be distinguished into materials and services inputs. However, the 
measurement of “offshore outsourcing” used in their study includes not only outsourcing but also in-
sourcing, for it is defined as the ratio of total imported inputs to total inputs. Taking into account the 
firm’s boundaries, offshore outsourcing to local firms through arm’s-length transactions should be 
distinguished from the total offshore sourcing. Hijzen et al. (2006) also estimated the impact of 
offshore sourcing on firm productivity using Japanese firm-level data for the period 1994–2000. They 
found that offshore sourcing defined as the ratio of the expenditure on subcontracting to foreign 
suppliers has a positive and significant effect on TFP even after controlling offshore in-sourcing 
defined as all intermediate purchases from the firm’s own foreign subsidiaries. Although they 
suggested the positive impact of offshore sourcing regardless of the firm’s boundaries, the definition of 
their data doesn't explicitly identify both offshore in-sourcing and outsourcing. Further, their definition 
of offshore sourcing is restricted to the manufacturing of goods and materials while firms’ offshoring 
activities have extended to a wide range of tasks including not only production parts, intermediate 
goods, and final assemblies but also financial, legal, and customer support services. Thus, there is a 
possibility of underestimating offshore sourcing due to the restriction of micro-data. 
In this paper, we examine the impacts of both offshore outsourcing and in-sourcing on the 
productivity by using the firm-level data that directly identifies outsourcing firms and in-sourcing firms. 
This data covers the firms that conduct offshore sourcing not only production outsourcing but also 
outsourcing of service-related tasks such as R&D, information services, customer support, and 
professional services through contracting out. To identify the causal effect on firm productivity, we 
                                                 
1 Görg et al. (2008), which extended data coverage to 1990–1998 and all manufacturing industries and 
took into account the status of trade activity and ownership, report similar results on labor productivity.   3
implement the propensity score matching with the difference-in-differences technique. The results 
show that offshore outsourcing has no impact on firm productivity though offshore in-sourcing has a 
positive impact on it with a time lag of several years. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the construction of the data set and 
general features of offshoring firms. In Section 3, we present an analytical framework to examine the 
effect of offshoring on firm productivity and empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the empirical results 
of the effect of offshoring on productivity and discusses the results, and section 5, the conclusions. 
 
2. Data and Statistical Descriptions 
2.1 Data 
To obtain basic information on the firm characteristics and performance, we used the Basic 
Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa, in Japanese) for 
the period 1997–2005, conducted by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (henceforth 
METI survey). This annual national survey is mandatory for all firms with 50 or more employees and 
whose paid-up capital or investment fund is over 30 million yen in mining, manufacturing, wholesale, 
retail, and food and beverage industries. This firm-level data allows us to construct a panel data set. As 
for the data on offshore sourcing activity, we used the Survey of Corporate Offshore Activities (Kigyo 
Kaigai Katsudo Chosa, in Japanese)
 2, which is an academic survey conducted by the Research 
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (henceforth RIETI survey) on 14,062 manufacturing firms 
listed in the METI survey. The RIETI survey succeeded in collecting responses from 5,528 firms. 
Considering that other previously available firm-level data sets on offshoring include only a limited 
                                                 
2 Firm-level data of this survey cannot be publicly disclosed. The authors are allowed to access this 
firm-level data set as a part of a RIETI research project. For details and aggregate statistics of the 
survey, Ito et al. (2007) provided a comprehensive description of this survey.   4
number of firms and are not designed to cover the entire manufacturing industry, this survey has a clear 
advantage in terms of its coverage.  This survey has direct information on a binary choice of foreign 
outsourcing with contracting out, explicitly distinguished from domestic outsourcing and from arm’s-
length purchases at foreign markets. This survey covers not only outsourcing of production-related 
tasks including final assembly, production of intermediates, and production of jigs/dies but also 
outsourcing of service-related tasks, such as R&D, information services, customer support, and 
professional services. Although this survey is a one-shot survey, its data include the status of offshore 
sourcing of five years earlier, as a retrospective question. Hence, we matched the METI data and 
RIETI data in 2000 and 2005. As a result, we could draw on more than 3,000 observations for each 
2000 and 2005 sample with accurate information on the variables of interest.  
With regard to the outsourcing partners, the survey distinguishes three types of firms: (a) own 
offshore subsidiaries which are defined by the majority ownership, (b) subsidiaries owned by other 
Japanese multinationals, and (c) foreign-owned firms including either local firms or subsidiaries of 
multinationals from third countries.
3 In this survey, as for the respondent firms, because two or more 
answers are permitted, the overlapping answer across three choices is potentially included in the data. 
In order to estimate the impact of offshoring respectively of offshore in-sourcing and offshore 
outsourcing separately, we constructed two dummy variables. One is the offshore in-sourcing dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm at least engages in contracts with its own offshore 
subsidiaries and 0 for non-offshoring firms. The other one is the offshore outsourcing dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 if the firm engages in exclusively arm’s-length contracts with local firms and 0 
for non-offshoring firms. Thus, the former dummy potentially includes the firms positively responding 
                                                 
3 Since the category (a) concentrates on the majority-owned subsidiaries, the categories (b) and (c) 
could include minority-owned affiliates of the outsourcing firm.   5
to the choice of both or either (b) or (c). The latter dummy covers the firms exclusively engaging in 
both or either (b) or (c) while the firms engaging in offshore in-sourcing are excluded from the sample. 
To measure firm performance, first, we calculated the value added as the total sales minus the 
sum of cost of goods sold and general and administrative costs minus wage, rental, depreciation, and 
tax costs. The total sales and part of the intermediate input are deflated by the output and input 
deflators, respectively. The deflators have been taken from the Japan Industrial Productivity (JIP) 
database of 2008, which has comprehensive Japanese industry-level data. The real capital stock is 
calculated by the perpetual inventory method, using the book value of fixed tangible assets and 
investment data from the METI surveys. The deflator of investment goods and the depreciation rate 
have also been sourced from the JIP database of 2008. The labor input indicates the number of total 
employees reported in the METI surveys. We estimate the TFP level for each firm using the above 
statistical data of sampled firms for the period 1997–2005. The direct calculation of TFP using the 
estimated coefficients of capital stock and labor in the Cobb-Douglas function form suffers from the 
endogeneity problem. As the benchmark of TFP, the estimated labor share and capital share are 0.76 






                                                 
4 In this procedure, the purchase of input is used as a proxy variable of productivity shock. We also 
applied an alternative method by using investment as the proxy, as proposed by Olley and Pakes 
(1996); however, the results were found to be almost the same. In consideration of omitted firms with 
zero investment, we relied on the estimator by the Levinsohn–Petrin procedure.   6
2.2 Differences of Productivity between Offshoring and Non-offshoring 
Before analyzing the causal effect of offshoring, we examine the difference in TFP distribution 
between offshoring firms and non-offshoring firms by pooling the data of 2000 and 2005. Figures 1 
and 2 present the kernel density estimate of productivity for the firms engaging in offshore in-sourcing 
and outsourcing compared to non-offshoring firms. Both results indicate that offshoring firms are 
likely to be more productive than non-offshoring firms. Further, we examined the difference in TFP 
distribution by applying t-tests for equality of differences in the means of the distributions and two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distribution functions. The differences with 
offshoring firms were statistically significant in both of two tests. These results suggest the 























kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0694
 
Figure 1. Differences in TFP: offshore in-sourcing vs non-offshoring 
Note: Kernel density estimate is applied to the pooled data of 2000 and 2005. 






















kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0694
 
Figure 2. Differences in TFP: offshore in-sourcing vs non-offshoring 
Note: Kernel density estimate is applied to the pooled data of 2000 and 2005. 
 
Next, we graphically compare the changes in the productivity level of both offshoring and non-
offshoring firms over time by using the panel data. The basic information at the firm-level is retrieved 
from the METI survey as the source for Japanese manufacturing firms while the data on outsourcing is 
collected from the RIETI survey. Using the offshore in-sourcing dummy and outsourcing dummy 
mentioned in the previous section and the panel data for the periods 1997-2005, we distinguished firms 
into non-offshoring firms, offshore insourcing firms and offshore outsourcing firms in 2000 and 
repeated to do so thereafter, and non-offshoring firms are restricted to firms that did not engage in 
offshoring in either 2000 or 2005. Figure 3 depicts the difference in the average of the logarithm of the 
TFP level over time between the three types as of 2000. The trends in the productivity level of 
offshoring firms provide important information to show the dynamic change attributed to offshoring.   8
The figure shows that even before 2000, the TFP of offshore in-sourcing firms and offshore 
outsourcing firms was already higher than that of non-offshoring firms. Further, it seems that the 
difference in TFP between offshoring firms and non-offshoring firms has expanded from year to year 
since around 2002. Although the different trend between the two would imply that offshoring activity 
yields high productivity, it cannot be identified as an influence by offshoring, and a further 
examination by econometric analysis would be required. More precisely, to compare the difference 
between offshoring firms and non-offshoring firms is not appropriate because the characteristics of 
both firms are potentially different and it may be due to other factors. In the next section, we present a 






























Figure 3. Differences in TFP over time 
Note: Each mean value over time is calculated in terms of the firms that engage in offshore in-sourcing, 
outsourcing and non-offshoring firms in 2000.   9
3. The Effect of Offshoring on Productivity Growth 
3.1 Analytical Framework 
The production of goods is a multistage process. Each stage of production activity can be 
considered to be a bundled task in the process of transformation from an intermediate product to a final 
product. At every stage, capital, labor, and intermediate goods are input. Outsourcing of a task is 
defined as unbundling the task from the production process and replacing it with intermediate goods 
produced outside of the firm.
5 If (1) the production activity of each stage is competitive, (2) prices of 
intermediate products are market dependent, and (3) primary factors such as capital and labor are 
available at a given price in the factor market, similar to the availability of labor at fixed wages in a 
labor market, a firm may be deficient in some stages of production because of the gap between the 
value of the marginal product of labor and the wage rate. In such a case, the firm will choose to (1) 
unbundle a task from the production process and offshore it to a foreign country where the wage rate is 
lower than the value of marginal product of labor, (2) re-import processed intermediate products, and 
(3) include them in the production process of the final product. In this manner, outsourcing enables a 
firm to work around the deficits in its own production process. 
Such a shift in resources to more efficient stages of a production process raises the productivity 
growth. Previous studies have included characterized offshoring by productivity growth in the 
aggregate production function. Our paper investigates how a one-shot change in the production process 
affects the TFP as well as the previous work (e.g. Görg and Hanley,2005;  Hijzen et al., 2006).  
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
On the basis of the framework of offshoring and productivity growth, we expect that offshoring 
positively affects a firm’s TFP growth. The statistical analysis presented in the former section 
                                                 
5 See Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Antràs (2003), Grossman and Rossi-Hansburg (2006), and so on.   10
identifies the only average difference in the productivity between offshoring firms and non-offshoring 
firms but it can not clarify the causality. In order to capture the causal effect of offshoring on firm 
productivity, we implement the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique developed by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) with the difference-in-differences technique. First, we estimate the binary response 
model on the choice of offshoring and gain the propensity score for each firm. In the second step, we 
match the similar non-offshoring firms with offshoring firms in terms of various firm characteristics 
using the propensity score by matching algorithms. Finally, we examine the difference in productivity 
growth between treated and matched control observations. 
The data on offshoring used in this analysis is dichotomous data, and we constructed the 
dummy variable,  it O that takes a value of 1 if the firm i enters into contracts with foreign suppliers in 
year t and 0 for non-offshoring firms. The productivity of firm i in year t+s ( 0  s ) and the firm 
characteristics in year t-1 is presented as   s t i Y  ,  and  1 ,  t i X , respectively. We can define the causal 
effect of offshoring on productivity as the difference in the performance between the offshoring firm 
non-offshoring firms by introducing the conditional independence assumption which means that the 
decision on offshore sourcing and the potential productivity are stochastically independent for the 
firms having the same exogenous characteristics,  1 ,  t i x . The average causal effect is written as; 
 
    1 , 1 ,
0
, 1 , 1 ,
1




, s t i Y   and  
0
, s t i Y   are potential outcome according to the status of offshoring, and  is 
the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT). The counterfactual group is created by using a 
selected group of non-offshoring firms that have similar firm characteristics,  1 ,  t i x . Thus, we need to   11
extract non-offshoring firms with similar firm characteristics from the sample. Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) propose using the propensity score to find the counterfactual group from the control group. The 
concrete procedure of this method is, first, to estimate predicted probabilities on entry of offshoring 
 1 , 1 , 1 Pr     t i t i it x X O  for each firm by probit or logit, secondly to select non-offshoring firms of 
which the probability is close to the probability of offshoring firms as the counterfactual group and 
finally, to estimate the difference of the productivity among both. The ATT estimates under the PSM 
procedure are shown by the following form. 
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where N is the number of offshoring firm and T means the treatment group while C means the control 
group.        1 , 1 , Pr , Pr   t j t i X X W  is a matching weight ( 1 0  W ) which depends on the probabilities 
of both offshoring  and non-offshoring firms. 
The panel data enable us to control for unobserved time-invariant firm individual effects by 
taking difference and to gain more robust estimates. The PSM technique can be enhanced to the 
Difference-in-differences (DID) estimate to which time invariable, individual effects can be removed 
by taking the difference. The ATT estimates in this case can be written as follows. 
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       (3) 
 
We use two matching techniques, nearest-neighbor matching and kernel matching to match 
offshoring firms with non-offshoring firms. Nearest-neighbor matching is to search out similar firms   12
to which the difference of the participation probability is minimized as shown in the next expression 
from the control group (non-offshoring firms).  
 
  k i D k j i p p p p   
  0 min                     (4) 
 
In the case of nearest-neighbor matching, three different matching methods are tested.  One is 
one-to-one matching, which matches each observation in the treatment group to only one control 
observation that has the closest propensity score, the second is k-nearest-neighbor matching, which 
allows matching more than one observation in the control group, and the third is caliper matching, 
which each observation in the treatment group is matched with a observation in the control group that 
has the closest propensity score within the caliper that is set at 0.01 in this analysis.  
Kernel matching is to apply the following matching weight in the equation (2) and (3). 
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where K is a kernel function and b is bandwidth.
6 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Propensity Score and Balancing Test 
It is necessary to estimate the participation probability whether to outsource to a foreign 
supplier with a contract as a procedure of the PSM technique. Following the empirical studies on 
                                                 
6 The epanechnikov kernel function is applied, and bandwidth is set to be 0.06 in this analysis.   13
determinants of offshoring (e.g. Girma and Görg, 2004; Kimura, 2002; Tomiura, 2005), we select the 
firm attributes expected to have an influence on the offshoring decision as explanatory variables, and 
gain the predicted probabilities by estimating the following logit model.  
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where subscript it denotes the index of the firm in the period t. The dependent variable is the log-odds 
ratio in terms of the probability on the participation in offshoring. We use lagged explanatory variables 
to avoid the simultaneity problem. The profit to total sales R/Q is included as a measure of business 
performance to control possible self-selection.
7 The labor cost saving strategies would be a major 
motivation to start offshoring in order to focus on core competencies. On the other hand, firms may 
need high technological capacity and skills to absorb output through offshoring activities. We add the 
capital-labor ratio K/L, wage per employees W, R&D expenditures over total sales R&D/Q and skill 
intensity defined as the number of employees in headquarters over total employees S/L. As other firm 
attributes, we employ the logarithm of the number of employees as a proxy for firm size lnL and the 
firm age AGE to control the firm’s vintage effect. The variation among industries is controlled by two-
                                                 
7 As suggested by Antràs and Helpman (2004), the productivity level would affect the decision of 
offshoring. We also confirmed that the results of ATT-DID is not substantially changed even if the 
lagged productivity level is added or adopted instead of profit rate in the logit model. However, we 
rely on the model excluding the lagged productivity level in order to avoid a possible violation of the 
conditional independence assumption.   14
digit industry dummy variables. Table 1 describes the summary of the statistics for each variable on 
the basis of the status of offshore in-sourcing and outsourcing. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
R/Q 0.027 0.056 0.032 0.054 0.027 0.056
lnL 5.041 0.845 6.167 1.398 5.138 0.959
K/L 13.395 19.844 15.096 14.127 13.541 19.423
W 4.764 1.52 5.418 1.615 4.82 1.539
R&D/Q 0.008 0.019 0.022 0.028 0.01 0.021
S/L 0.15 0.117 0.18 0.124 0.152 0.118
AGE 37.977 15.383 44.748 16.771 38.558 15.62
Variable Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
R/Q 0.027 0.056 0.026 0.052 0.027 0.056
lnL 5.041 0.845 5.342 0.954 5.066 0.858
K/L 13.395 19.844 11.879 13.869 13.266 19.412
W 4.764 1.52 4.955 1.585 4.78 1.526
R&D/Q 0.008 0.019 0.015 0.025 0.009 0.02
S/L 0.15 0.117 0.18 0.124 0.152 0.118













Since we have the METI data collecting basic information at the firm-level for the period 
1997–2005 and the RIETI data on offshore sourcing activity in 2000 and 2005, the logit model is 
estimated by cross-sectional data of 2000, offshoring firms in 2000 are matched with non-offshoring 
firms that have similar characteristics
8   and ATT-DID is estimated after 2000. Therefore the 
                                                 
8 The control group is defined as non-offshoring firms that did not perform offshore sourcing in both 
years of 2000 and 2005.    15
explanatory variables in year 1999 are included in the model. The estimation result is displayed in 
Table 2. In both cases of offshore in-sourcing and outsourcing, the coefficient of the lagged profit rate 
is not statistically significant though it was forecast that the firms with good performance would be 
selected. The results show that the firm size and skill intensity have a positive impact on the 
probability of participation in offshoring. The coefficient of the number of employees is significantly 
positive in both estimations. As the firm-level analyses on the determinants of internationalization 
have shown, the larger the firm size is, the more active offshoring is. The skill intensity measured by 
the ratio of employees in headquarters has a positive sign, suggesting that offshoring activities require 
firms to strengthen skill capabilities. As for capital-labor ratio, a negative coefficient is expected if 
labor cost saving as a motivation of offshoring is supported. The coefficient of capital-labor ratio is 
not statistically significant in the case of in-sourcing, while being negative and significant in the case 
of outsourcing. Both coefficients of wage per employee and R&D intensity are not significant at all 
while the firm age is positively correlated with offshore in-sourcing. The older firms are more inclined 






                                                 
9 As for the ATT estimate value by the PSM technique, the result was influenced by selecting the 
explanatory variable used for estimating participation probability (Heckman et al., 1998). However, a 
substantial change was not seen in the following ATT estimate, even though the combination of 
explanatory variables changed as the variables were added or dropped, one by one, and the ATT 
estimate was tested. We also omit the variables that have no explanatory power and estimate ATT, 
however, the change in the results was negligible.   16





















Log likelihood  -725.63 -833.31
Pseudo R2 0.216 0.08  
 
It is necessary to match similar non-offshoring firms in terms of firm attributes with offshoring 
firms to obtain the ATT estimate by the PSM technique with high accuracy. The sample is restricted 
by imposing the common support condition which means non-offshoring firms whose probability is 
higher than offshoring firms with the maximum probability and offshoring firms whose probability is 
lower than non-offshoring firms with the minimum probability are excluded from the sample.
10 After 
the match, we carry out the balancing test to judge whether the difference of the mean value in terms 
of firm attributes used in the estimation for the participation probability between both groups is 
statistically different from 0. It can be judged that non-offshoring firms with firm attributes similar to 
offshoring firms are correctly matched if a significant difference is not statistically found for each 
                                                 
10  The loss of the number of observations by common support condition was very few.   17
variable between the two. As in all matching techniques, the null hypothesis that the difference of the 
means of the variable between offshoring firms and matched non-offshoring firms is zero is not 
rejected for all variables after the match, though the hypothesis is rejected in many cases before the 
match. This result indicates that the matched non-offshoring firms resemble the offshoring firms in 
terms of the firm attributes. The results of balancing tests for each variable used in the logit estimation 
are displayed in Appendix 1 and 2. 
                                                                       
4.2 Estimate of offshoring effect on productivity  
Using the propensity score on participation in offshoring gained from the logit estimation, we 
estimate the ATT with DID in terms of the logarithm of TFP in the matched sample. The effect of 
offshore in-sourcing and outsourcing on productivity may be different in magnitude. We estimate the 
effect of offshoring on TFP with respect to both offshore in-sourcing and outsourcing, distinguishing 
offshoring firms into firms engaging in both in-sourcing to a firm’s foreign subsidiaries and 
outsourcing to local firms through arm’s-length transactions and firms engaging in exclusively 
offshore outsourcing. In both cases, the control group is non-offshoring firms. 
Table 3 presents the results of ATT with DID estimate in the case of offshore in-sourcing. 
Since the effects of offshoring might have a time lag to appear, the ATT estimate is calculated from 
the time of t to five years later, namely from 2000 to 2005 that data is available. The difference in 
lnTFP is defined as lnTFP in each year minus that in year 2000. Hence, the estimates indicate TFP 
growth rate due to offshoring. The first and second columns present the mean value of each status of 
offshoring, the third column displays ATT with DID estimates, and the results for testing the null of 
equivalence between groups are indicated in the right side of each panel. The difference after four or 
five years is positive and statistically significant at the significance level of 5% while those before   18
2003 are not significant. The results indicate that offshoring through intra-firm in-sourcing has a 
positive impact on productivity growth after controlling unobserved firm individual effects, but the 
effects appear with a time lag of four or five years. The estimated ATT with DID of Table 3, for 
instance, implies that offshore in-sourcing leads to a 9-11% increase in TFP four or five years after 
offshoring. 
Table 3. ATT with DID Results on Offshore In-sourcing 
Variable Yes No t-value p>|t| Yes No t-value p>|t|
ΔlnTFP2001 -0.062 -0.046 -0.016 -0.710 0.481 -0.062 -0.057 -0.005 -0.220 0.829
ΔlnTFP2002 -0.003 -0.007 0.003 0.120 0.907 -0.003 0.008 -0.012 -0.410 0.683
ΔlnTFP2003 0.133 0.087 0.045 1.310 0.190 0.133 0.092 0.040 1.150 0.252
ΔlnTFP2004 0.218 0.132 0.086 2.130 0.033 0.218 0.112 0.106 2.540 0.011
ΔlnTFP2005 0.284 0.187 0.097 2.120 0.034 0.284 0.168 0.116 2.600 0.010
Variable Yes No t-value p>|t| Yes No t-value p>|t|
ΔlnTFP2001 -0.061 -0.058 -0.003 -0.130 0.896 -0.062 -0.062 0.000 0.000 0.999
ΔlnTFP2002 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.030 0.977 -0.003 -0.005 0.001 0.040 0.965
ΔlnTFP2003 0.134 0.083 0.051 1.430 0.153 0.133 0.080 0.053 1.470 0.142
ΔlnTFP2004 0.224 0.121 0.103 2.500 0.013 0.218 0.121 0.097 2.320 0.021
ΔlnTFP2005 0.288 0.176 0.112 2.460 0.014 0.284 0.176 0.108 2.370 0.018

























Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis; *, ** indicate significance at the 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
We also examine the effect of offshore outsourcing to local firms in foreign countries on TFP 
growth. The ATT with DID estimates of offshore outsourcing are presented in Table 4. The estimates 
show the positive sign in most cases, but they are not statistically significant in any of the matching 
techniques. This result indicates that there is no difference in average productivity growth between   19
non-offshoring firms matched to the treated and the firms conducting offshore outsourcing, and it is 
suggested that offshore outsourcing to local suppliers does not contribute to productivity growth.
11 
 
Table 4. ATT with DID Results on Offshore Outsourcing 
Variable Yes No t-value p>|t| Yes No t-value p>|t|
ΔlnTFP2001 -0.072 -0.073 0.000 0.020 0.986 -0.072 -0.079 0.007 0.280 0.782
ΔlnTFP2002 -0.024 -0.045 0.021 0.570 0.571 -0.024 -0.059 0.035 1.010 0.314
ΔlnTFP2003 0.087 0.098 -0.011 -0.270 0.784 0.087 0.054 0.033 0.820 0.415
ΔlnTFP2004 0.181 0.162 0.019 0.430 0.669 0.181 0.118 0.063 1.530 0.128
ΔlnTFP2005 0.218 0.209 0.009 0.170 0.865 0.218 0.165 0.052 1.070 0.286
Variable Yes No t-value p>|t| Yes No t-value p>|t|
ΔlnTFP2001 -0.072 -0.080 0.008 0.290 0.772 -0.072 -0.068 -0.004 -0.170 0.865
ΔlnTFP2002 -0.024 -0.060 0.036 1.030 0.306 -0.024 -0.044 0.019 0.610 0.543
ΔlnTFP2003 0.087 0.053 0.033 0.840 0.402 0.087 0.047 0.040 0.990 0.321
ΔlnTFP2004 0.181 0.117 0.064 1.550 0.121 0.181 0.107 0.074 1.770 0.077




























4.3 Discussion  
The estimated results show that offshore in-sourcing increases productivity growth with a time 
lag of several years. On the other hand, the results of estimation for offshore outsourcing indicate that 
outsourcing through arm's-length contracts has no impact on productivity growth. It would be an 
                                                 
11 We obtained the comparable result of the ATT estimate without the difference-in-differences. See 
Appendix 3 and 4.   20
interesting issue to discuss why the effect of offshore in-sourcing has a time-lag and why the results are 
different according to firm boundaries.  
One possible explanation for our finding of time-lag is that the reallocation of resources to 
other production processes within the firm takes a time-lag to affect productivity. Offshoring activities 
enable firms to specialize in production processes with core competencies. However, resources shifted 
to other production processes, which are supposed to be more skill intensive than the processes that can 
be outsourced, would improve productivity through learning by doing. Therefore, it is expected that 
time is required until the reallocation of the resources can indeed contribute to productivity growth. 
The time-lag until the appearance of the effect of offshore in-sourcing in our result may reflect the 
interpretation. 
Regarding the second question, the result might reflect that the outsourced task is different 
according to firm boundaries. The survey on offshoring used in this study also contains disaggregated 
information on the types of tasks outsourced offshore at the firm-level. The survey distinguishes three 
production-related tasks (production of intermediates, final assembly, and production of jigs/dies), four 
service-related tasks (R&D, information services, customer support, professional (legal, accounting, or 
financial) services, and the other tasks. We found that two tasks (the production of intermediates and 
the final assembly) are most frequently offshore sourced and whose share to total offshore sourcing is 
35%, respectively. Moreover, the data shows that final assembly tends to be relatively often in-sourced 
to firms’ own foreign subsidiaries, while the production of intermediates concentrates on the case of 
outsourcing through arm's-length contracting.
12 Therefore, our results might be associated with the 
                                                 
12 According to our survey as reported in Ito et al. (2007), Table 6, in around half of the cases, the final 
assembly and the production of intermediates are in-sourced within the boundary of multinationals and 
outsourced to foreign unrelated suppliers, respectively.   21
difference of tasks between in-sourcing and outsourcing. Firms engaging in in-sourcing the more labor-
intensive production processes, such as final assembly, might possibly be able to concentrate on more 
advanced production processes compared with firms that choose to outsource the production of 
intermediates. The gain from specializing in more advanced production processes is expected to be 
larger than in other production processes which can be outsourced beyond the firm’s boundaries. As a 
result, the rise of productivity is observed by the in-sourcing firm that has succeeded in subcontracting 
the final assembly stage in which productivity is expected to be low to outside the firm.
13  
Of course, it is expected that there are various factors affecting the contrastive results besides 
the difference in tasks outsourced. First, our finding that the offshore in-sourcing has a positive impact 
on productivity while offshore outsourcing has no impact may be due to the difference in the level of 
offshoring.
14 More precisely, the productivity effects can be distinguished into the extensive margin 
and the intensive margin depending on the intensity of offshoring activities.  However, this paper does 
not examine this issue because the data on amount of offshore sourcing is not available. The magnitude 
of productivity effects would sure be different if the firms increase offshore sourcing. Second, one 
would expect that transfer pricing may affect the  behavior of in-sourcing firms and cause the 
contrastive result through the difference in offshoring costs across arm's-length and owned subsidiary. 
If multinational firms prefer to shift profit from abroad to home country to avoid taxation abroad, the 
firms may have a incentive to engage in in-sourcing their tasks to foreign subsidiaries at a lower than 
arm’s length price. As a result, it can be observed that the productivity gains concentrate on in-sourcing 
                                                 
13 Although it is likely to be able to examine whether this interpretation is correct by disaggregating 
data according to the task further, we have not tested because the number of observations decreased 
sharply. 
14 Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) theoretically suggest that the magnitude of productivity effect 
depends on the range of offshored tasks.   22
firms. However, an opposite influence is foreseen in the case of Japanese firm because the effective 
corporate tax rate in Japan is approximately 41% as of 2009, which is the highest level in the world. It 
seems that the enterprise has moved the profit to foreign countries through transfer pricing. Therefore, 
transfer pricing is not expected to lead the positive effect of in-sourcing at least while such a tax 
incentive should be controlled. Further examination of these issues would be required for a 
comprehensive understanding the productivity effect of offshoring. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In recent years, great interest has been aroused in the examination of the impact of offshore 
sourcing that has increased rapidly and expanded over various tasks. This paper examines the causal 
effect of offshore sourcing on TFP growth by shedding light on the organizational form in terms of the 
ownership of suppliers and on the time-lag in appearance of the effects, using Japanese firm-level data 
in manufacturing industries over the period 2000–2005. The advantage of this study, over previous 
studies, is a distinctive investigation of offshore sourcing between offshore in-sourcing and 
outsourcing based on firm-level data. The effect of offshore sourcing is examined separately with 
respect to offshore in-sourcing and outsourcing by distinguishing offshore sourcing firms into firms 
engaging in both in-sourcing to firm’s foreign subsidiaries and outsourcing to local firms through 
arm’s-length transactions and firms engaging in exclusively offshore outsourcing.  
The results are summarized as follows. First, the impact of offshore in-sourcing within 
multinationals on productivity measured as TFP is found to be positive. One interesting finding is that 
there was a time-lag in the appearance of the impacts. This result implies that the effect is dynamic 
through learning by doing in more skill intensive processes. Second, it is found that offshore 
outsourcing through arm’s-length contracting out did not affect productivity. These contrastive results   23
between offshore in-sourcing and outsourcing may indicate that the productivity gain is associated 
with the difference in offshoring tasks between the two types of sourcing.  
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Appendix 1. Balancing Tests on Offshore In-sourcing 
(a) one-to-one matching (c) caliper matching
Variable Sample Yes No t-value p>|t| Variable Sample Yes No t-value p>|t|
R/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.035 0.028 12.5 1.90 0.057 R/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.035 0.028 12.5 1.90 0.057
Matched 0.034 0.028 10.9 12.9 1.35 0.178 Matched 0.033 0.033 0.7 94.7 0.08 0.938
lnL t-1 Unmatched 6.261 5.083 102.0 20.53 0.000 lnL t-1 Unmatched 6.261 5.083 102.0 20.53 0.000
Matched 6.103 6.040 5.5 94.6 0.59 0.555 Matched 6.017 6.007 0.8 99.2 0.09 0.928
K/L t-1 Unmatched 15.250 13.559 9.9 1.35 0.177 K/L t-1 Unmatched 15.250 13.559 9.9 1.35 0.177
Matched 15.011 12.873 12.6 -26.4 1.85 0.064 Matched 14.614 14.280 2.0 80.2 0.24 0.812
W t-1 Unmatched 5.463 4.795 43.5 7.00 0.000 W t-1 Unmatched 5.463 4.795 43.5 7.00 0.000
Matched 5.369 5.268 6.6 85.0 0.72 0.469 Matched 5.333 5.354 -1.4 96.8 -0.15 0.880
RD/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.024 0.009 59.7 11.08 0.000 RD/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.024 0.009 59.7 11.08 0.000
Matched 0.022 0.020 8.8 85.3 0.86 0.389 Matched 0.021 0.022 -1.6 97.4 -0.15 0.880
S/L t-1 Unmatched 0.180 0.150 25.9 4.17 0.000 S/L t-1 Unmatched 0.180 0.150 25.9 4.17 0.000
Matched 0.180 0.179 1.2 95.2 0.13 0.893 Matched 0.182 0.181 1.2 95.3 0.13 0.899
AGE t-1 Unmatched 45.828 38.417 47.3 7.55 0.000 AGE t-1 Unmatched 45.828 38.417 47.3 7.55 0.000
Matched 45.115 44.096 6.5 86.2 0.70 0.483 Matched 44.749 45.341 -3.8 92.0 -0.40 0.690
(b) k-nearlest neighbour matching (d) kernel matching
Variable Sample Yes No t-value p>|t| Variable Sample Yes No t-value p>|t|
R/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.035 0.028 12.5 1.90 0.057 R/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.035 0.028 12.5 1.90 0.057
Matched 0.034 0.033 1.5 87.6 0.19 0.852 Matched 0.034 0.033 1.7 86.4 0.20 0.841
lnL t-1 Unmatched 6.261 5.083 102.0 20.53 0.000 lnL t-1 Unmatched 6.261 5.083 102.0 20.53 0.000
Matched 6.103 6.094 0.8 99.2 0.08 0.934 Matched 6.103 6.052 4.4 95.7 0.46 0.644
K/L t-1 Unmatched 15.250 13.559 9.9 1.35 0.177 K/L t-1 Unmatched 15.250 13.559 9.9 1.35 0.177
Matched 15.011 14.617 2.3 76.7 0.28 0.776 Matched 15.011 14.508 3.0 70.3 0.38 0.704
W t-1 Unmatched 5.463 4.795 43.5 7.00 0.000 W t-1 Unmatched 5.463 4.795 43.5 7.00 0.000
Matched 5.369 5.387 -1.2 97.3 -0.13 0.897 Matched 5.369 5.299 4.6 89.5 0.51 0.607
RD/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.024 0.009 59.7 11.08 0.000 RD/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.024 0.009 59.7 11.08 0.000
Matched 0.022 0.023 -2.2 96.4 -0.21 0.834 Matched 0.022 0.022 0.9 98.6 0.08 0.934
S/L t-1 Unmatched 0.180 0.150 25.9 4.17 0.000 S/L t-1 Unmatched 0.180 0.150 25.9 4.17 0.000
Matched 0.180 0.181 -0.8 97.0 -0.09 0.932 Matched 0.180 0.176 3.7 85.6 0.40 0.689
AGE t-1 Unmatched 45.828 38.417 47.3 7.55 0.000 AGE t-1 Unmatched 45.828 38.417 47.3 7.55 0.000
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Appendix 2. Balancing Tests on Offshore Outsourcing 
(a) one-to-one matching (c) caliper matching
Variable Sample Yes No t-value p>|t| Variable Sample Yes No t-value p>|t|
R/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.028 0.028 -0.4 -0.05 0.958 R/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.028 0.028 -0.4 -0.05 0.958
Matched 0.028 0.030 -3.9 -1026.0 -0.46 0.643 Matched 0.028 0.027 2.1 -487.1 0.23 0.815
lnL t-1 Unmatched 5.360 5.083 31.6 5.09 0.000 lnL t-1 Unmatched 5.360 5.083 31.6 5.09 0.000
Matched 5.356 5.263 10.6 66.6 1.14 0.255 Matched 5.356 5.317 4.4 85.9 0.48 0.632
K/L t-1 Unmatched 11.197 13.559 -14.1 -1.86 0.062 K/L t-1 Unmatched 11.197 13.559 -14.1 -1.86 0.062
Matched 11.231 9.672 9.3 34.0 1.62 0.105 Matched 11.231 10.811 2.5 82.2 0.40 0.686
W t-1 Unmatched 4.956 4.795 10.5 1.66 0.096 W t-1 Unmatched 4.956 4.795 10.5 1.66 0.096
Matched 4.965 4.806 10.3 1.7 1.22 0.223 Matched 4.965 4.950 0.9 91.2 0.11 0.914
RD/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.014 0.009 23.9 4.08 0.000 RD/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.014 0.009 23.9 4.08 0.000
Matched 0.014 0.016 -7.4 69.1 -0.70 0.486 Matched 0.014 0.015 -3.8 84.3 -0.37 0.711
S/L t-1 Unmatched 0.176 0.150 22.4 3.58 0.000 S/L t-1 Unmatched 0.176 0.150 22.4 3.58 0.000
Matched 0.177 0.176 0.5 97.8 0.05 0.958 Matched 0.177 0.179 -2.3 89.7 -0.25 0.804
AGE t-1 Unmatched 39.796 38.417 9.0 1.39 0.164 AGE t-1 Unmatched 39.796 38.417 9.0 1.39 0.164
Matched 39.663 39.682 -0.1 98.6 -0.01 0.988 Matched 39.663 40.448 -5.1 43.1 -0.60 0.550
(b) k-nearlest neighbour matching (d) kernel matching
Variable Sample Yes No t-value p>|t| Variable Sample Yes No t-value p>|t|
R/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.028 0.028 -0.4 -0.05 0.958 R/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.028 0.028 -0.4 -0.05 0.958
Matched 0.028 0.027 2.1 -512.0 0.24 0.808 Matched 0.028 0.028 -0.1 68.6 -0.01 0.990
lnL t-1 Unmatched 5.360 5.083 31.6 5.09 0.000 lnL t-1 Unmatched 5.360 5.083 31.6 5.09 0.000
Matched 5.356 5.320 4.0 87.2 0.43 0.666 Matched 5.356 5.305 5.8 81.7 0.62 0.537
K/L t-1 Unmatched 11.197 13.559 -14.1 -1.86 0.062 K/L t-1 Unmatched 11.197 13.559 -14.1 -1.86 0.062
Matched 11.231 10.824 2.4 82.8 0.39 0.695 Matched 11.231 11.592 -2.2 84.7 -0.31 0.758
W t-1 Unmatched 4.956 4.795 10.5 1.66 0.096 W t-1 Unmatched 4.956 4.795 10.5 1.66 0.096
Matched 4.965 4.954 0.7 93.2 0.08 0.933 Matched 4.965 4.931 2.2 79.2 0.25 0.802
RD/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.014 0.009 23.9 4.08 0.000 RD/Q t-1 Unmatched 0.014 0.009 23.9 4.08 0.000
Matched 0.014 0.015 -4.3 82.1 -0.42 0.673 Matched 0.014 0.014 3.5 85.3 0.36 0.719
S/L t-1 Unmatched 0.176 0.150 22.4 3.58 0.000 S/L t-1 Unmatched 0.176 0.150 22.4 3.58 0.000
Matched 0.177 0.180 -2.6 88.4 -0.28 0.780 Matched 0.177 0.172 3.6 83.7 0.39 0.698
AGE t-1 Unmatched 39.796 38.417 9.0 1.39 0.164 AGE t-1 Unmatched 39.796 38.417 9.0 1.39 0.164
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Appendix 3. ATT Estimates on Offshore In-sourcing 
Variable Yes No t-value p>|t| Yes No t-value p>|t|
lnTFP2000 2.786 2.741 0.044 0.980 0.330 2.786 2.777 0.009 0.190 0.848
lnTFP2001 2.721 2.692 0.029 0.600 0.547 2.721 2.719 0.002 0.030 0.973
lnTFP2002 2.791 2.741 0.051 0.980 0.328 2.791 2.796 -0.004 -0.080 0.935
lnTFP2003 2.924 2.836 0.088 1.600 0.110 2.924 2.874 0.050 0.910 0.364
lnTFP2004 3.005 2.865 0.140 2.450 0.015 3.005 2.888 0.117 2.070 0.039
lnTFP2005 3.070 2.929 0.141 2.380 0.018 3.070 2.945 0.125 2.160 0.031
Variable Yes No t-value p>|t| Yes No t-value p>|t|
lnTFP2000 2.757 2.758 -0.001 -0.010 0.990 2.786 2.762 0.024 0.540 0.589
lnTFP2001 2.695 2.702 -0.006 -0.130 0.895 2.721 2.700 0.022 0.450 0.651
lnTFP2002 2.766 2.764 0.001 0.020 0.982 2.791 2.763 0.028 0.530 0.597
lnTFP2003 2.895 2.844 0.051 0.920 0.356 2.924 2.847 0.077 1.390 0.165
lnTFP2004 2.981 2.875 0.106 1.870 0.062 3.005 2.882 0.123 2.150 0.032





















Appendix 4. ATT Estimates on Offshore Outsourcing 
Variable Yes No t-value p>|t| Yes No t-value p>|t|
lnTFP2000 2.575 2.577 -0.002 -0.060 0.951 2.575 2.590 -0.015 -0.390 0.698
lnTFP2001 2.499 2.511 -0.012 -0.300 0.767 2.499 2.513 -0.014 -0.330 0.741
lnTFP2002 2.552 2.532 0.020 0.430 0.666 2.552 2.533 0.018 0.390 0.699
lnTFP2003 2.675 2.673 0.002 0.040 0.968 2.675 2.643 0.032 0.610 0.542
lnTFP2004 2.759 2.740 0.018 0.340 0.733 2.759 2.707 0.052 0.960 0.337
lnTFP2005 2.793 2.786 0.006 0.110 0.915 2.793 2.756 0.037 0.620 0.535
Variable Yes No t-value p>|t| Yes No t-value p>|t|
lnTFP2000 2.575 2.589 -0.014 -0.360 0.722 2.575 2.568 0.007 0.170 0.862
lnTFP2001 2.499 2.511 -0.012 -0.290 0.770 2.499 2.502 -0.003 -0.070 0.943
lnTFP2002 2.552 2.532 0.020 0.430 0.669 2.552 2.528 0.024 0.520 0.601
lnTFP2003 2.675 2.641 0.034 0.650 0.513 2.675 2.616 0.060 1.130 0.258
lnTFP2004 2.759 2.704 0.054 1.010 0.315 2.759 2.674 0.084 1.540 0.124
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